

Message Text

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EXDIS/SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

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SUBJECT: NAC STATEMENT

REF: STATE 139645

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IS APPROVED FOR USE JULY 25
PER REFTEL.

BEGIN TEXT.

2. IN LIGHT OF THE INTEREST THAT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN
CLARIFYING SEVERAL POINTS RELATING TO SALT, I HAVE A BRIEF
STATEMENT TO MAKE.

FIRST OF ALL, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS
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HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED TO THE U.S. PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD
DURING MAY 1973, WHICH AMBASSADOR JOHNSON PREVIOUSLY OUT-
LINED TO THE COUNCIL. THE SOVIETS ACCEPT THE FACT THAT
THE NEXT STEP IN THE NEGOTIATION WILL BE THEIR RESPONSE TO

THOSE PROPOSALS.

DURING THE SUMMIT MEETING PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV SIGNED A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS." THE SEVEN BASIC PRINCIPLES CONTAINED THEREIN WILL SERVE AS A BASIS TO GUIDE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA WHEN THEY ARE RESUMED, PROBABLY IN SEPTEMBER. THOSE PRINCIPLES ARE ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. POSITION WHICH REMAINS AS OUTLINED TO YOU BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON IN MAY, AND SUPPLEMENTED BY DR. KISSINGER JUNE 30.

WE FEEL CONFIDENT THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THESE PRINCIPLES WILL BE HELPFUL IN MOVING FORWARD TOWARD DEVELOPING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY TO LONG-TERM PROSPECTS FOR PEACE.

AS TO THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES, I WOULD NOTE THAT PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV DECIDED THAT THE APPROACH OF AGREEING ON SOME PRINCIPLES WHICH COULD GUIDE THE NEGOTIATORS COULD GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO THE TALKS. LET ME MENTION IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WISHED TO HAVE INCLUDED IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WHAT IN EFFECT WOULD HAVE BEEN A RECOGNITION OF THEIR POSITION ON "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS". YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE AGREED DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY SUCH STATEMENT; IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET SIDE INITIALLY SOUGHT TO HAVE A LONGER TIMEFRAME SET AS OUR GOAL FOR CONCLUSION OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT; NAMELY, "1974/1975". WE BELIEVED THAT EFFORTS TOWARD ACHIEVING AN EARLIER AGREEMENT WOULD BE MORE DESIRABLE. AS YOU KNOW, THE BASIC PRINCIPLES DOCUMENT CALLS FOR "SERIOUS EFFORTS" TO CONCLUDE A PERMANENT AGREEMENT FOR SIGNING IN 1974.

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IN THE SUMMIT TALKS AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE, WE CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET SIDE THAT WE WILL ACCEPT NO OBLIGATION WHICH WOULD INFRINGE ON OUR RESPONSIBILITIES TO OUR ALLIES AND THE ALLIANCE. IN ADDITION, THIS POINT HAS BEEN MADE PUBLICLY WITHIN THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES. FOR EXAMPLE, IN BRIEFING THE PRESS ON JUNE 21, DR. KISSINGER SAID IN CONNECTING WITH THE SECOND PRINCIPLE THAT "...WE HAVE ALWAYS MAINTAIN THE POSITION THAT WE DID NOT SEPARATE OUR SECURITY INTERESTS FROM THOSE OF OUR ALLIES." INDEED, ARTICLE V OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY IS QUITE EXPLICIT IN IDENTIFYING THE MUTUALITY OF OUR INTERESTS. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE MAKING THIS POINT IN THE FUTURE, BOTH WITH THE SOVIETS, AND IN

APPROPRIATE PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AS WE HAVE DONE REPEATEDLY IN THE PAST.

I WOULD LIKE NEXT TO COMMENT ON SOME SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES, IN LIGHT OF QUESTIONS RAISED IN OUR JUNE 21 COUNCIL DISCUSSION AND SOME OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH WERE MORE RECENTLY POSED BY THE FRG AND CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT FORCE EITHER SIDE TO AGREE TO SOMETHING TO WHICH IT WOULD NOT OTHERWISE AGREE; BUT IT DOES CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS COMMITMENT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO SEEK A PERMANENT AGREEMENT FOR CONCLUSION DURING 1974. FOR ITS PART, THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO PURSUE THE NEGOTIATIONS SERIOUSLY BUT DELIBERATELY, WITH A CONSTANT AWARENESS OF OUR COMMON ALLIANCE INTERESTS.

INsofar AS THE "SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION" OF STRATEGIC ARMS IS CONCERNED, THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN A GENERAL INTEREST, REFERRING FREQUENTLY TO BREZHNEV'S SPEECH OF DECEMBER 21 IN THIS CONNECTION, BUT SO FAR HAVE GIVEN NO CLEAR IDEA AS TO THE SPECIFIC FORM OF REDUCTIONS THEY MAY BE CONTEMPLATING.

THE SECOND BASIC PRINCIPLE STATES THAT "NEW AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS WILL BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN-SOVIET SECRET

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DOCUMENTS ADOPTED IN MOSCOW IN MAY 1972 AND THE AGREEMENTS REACH IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE 1973 ...". THE CITATION OF AGREEMENTS REACH IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE 1973 REFERS MAINLY TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLES DOCUMENT ITSELF, BUT IT ALSO REFERS TO THE GENERAL SPIRIT BEHIND THE OTHER AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN WASHINGTON DURING THE SUMMIT. IN THE FRAMING OF THIS PRINCIPLE, WE CLEARLY HAD IN MIND THAT THE "EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS" OF THE U.S. INCLUDED THOSE OF OUR ALLIES, AS WE HAVE STATED PUBLICLY. INsofar AS SOVIET FBS CLAIMS ARE CONCERNED, THE UNITED STATES POSITION IS THAT OUR NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROPOSAL PROVIDES A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION TO THE FBS ISSUE. MOREOVER, AT THE SUMMIT, WE REJECTED SOVIET EFFORTS TO INCLUDE FBS AND NON-TRANSFER IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES.

WITH REGARD TO THE FOURTH PRINCIPLE, I SHOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT IT SIMPLY REAFFIRMS A PRINCIPLE WHICH IS BOTH FAMILIAR AND VITAL IN SALT -- THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFIABILITY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

INsofar AS THE FIFTH PRINCIPLE IS CONCERN, THE

LANGUAGE MEANS THAT MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WILL BE PERMITTED, BUT WILL BE SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENTS.

WITH RESPECT TO THE SIXTH PRINCIPLE, WHAT IS CONTEMPLATED IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SIDES MAY REACH AGREEMENT ON SEPARATE MEASURES TO SUPPLEMENT THE EXISTING INTERIM AGREEMENT, PENDING CONCLUSION OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. THE IMPLICATION IS THAT ANY SUCH MEASURES SHOULD BE ONES WHICH WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH AND MAY BE ABSORBED BY A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

INSOFAR AS THE SEVENTH PRINCIPLE IS CONCERNED, WHAT IS IMPLIED IS THAT EACH SIDE WILL UNILATERALLY AND INDEPENDENTLY CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ITS OWN MEASURES FOR PREVENTING ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER ITS CONTROL.

IN ADDITION TO QUESTIONS BEARING SPECIFICALLY ON THE
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BASIC PRINCIPLES, THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TOUCHING ON SOME MORE CONCRETE OR TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATION. I WOULD LIKE NOW TO ADDRESS SOME OF THESE. OTHERS WE HOPE TO DEAL WITH ON A SUBSEQUENT OCCASION.

THE QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED OF THE SOVIETS POSSIBLY DEVELOPING MIRV FOR AN SLBM AND THEN DEPLOYING THESE MIRVS WITH AN ICBM. THE PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT WE HAVE PROPOSED, WITH ITS VARIOUS COROLLARY CONSTRAINTS WOULD PROHIBIT TESTING OF THESE SLBM MIRVS ON AN ICBM, AND WE BELIEVE WE CAN VERIFY THIS PROHIBITION. WITHOUT SUCH TESTING, SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN SUCH AN ICBM WOULD BE LIMITED.

THE UNITED STATES' FORMULATION ON AGGREGATES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ALLOWS AN INCREASE IN BOMBER FORCES OF EITHER SIDE AT THE COST OF REDUCTIONS IN OTHER SYSTEMS, PRIMARILY BECAUSE IN THE UNITED STATES' VIEW, BOMBERS ARE INTRINSICALLY LESS DESTABILIZING THAN MISSILES -- A POINT WE HAVE EMPHASIZED TO THE SOVIETS WHEN DEALING WITH THEIR EXTRAORDINARY DEMANDS FOR LIMITATIONS ON BOMBER ARMAMENTS. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS INTERESTED IN A FUTURE SHIFT FROM MISSILES TO BOMBER FORCES.

NOW I WOULD LIKE TO TURN TO THE THREE NATIONAL PAPERS SUBMITTED BY THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, A THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, WHICH ADDRESS CERTAIN ISSUES IN SALT; AND IN PARTICULAR, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF PAPER OF JANUARY 5, WHICH INCORPORATES MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE THREE NATIONAL PAPERS AND OUTLINES THE STATE OF COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS ON THOSE ASPECTS OF

SALT WHICH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AGREED WOULD MOST IMMEDIATELY CONCERN THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

AS AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAS PREVIOUSLY INFORMED THE COUNCIL, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS CLOSELY EXAMINED THE THREE NATIONAL PAPERS -- THE NETHERLANDS PAPER OF NOVEMBER 9, 1972; THE UNITED KINGDOM PAPER OF NOVEMBER 28, 1972; AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY PAPER OF DEC. 2, 1972. THE UNITED STATES BENEFITED CONSIDERABLY FROM THE DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN THOSE PAPERS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SECRET

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NETHERLANDS PAPER POINTED OUT THAT GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS DO NOT NECESSARILY DISFAVOR THE SOVIET UNION IN THE OVERALL STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IN FACT, WE HAVE MADE THIS VERY POINT WITH THE SOVIETS. EVER SINCE SALT BEGAN, WE HAVE REJECT THE SIMPLISTIC SOVIET DEFINITION OF "STRATEGIC", AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO SO. DURING THE LAST SESSION IN GENEVA, WE ELABORATED ON ASPECTS OF GEOGRAPHY WHICH WE BELIEVE ACTUALLY FAVOR THE USSR. THE ANALYSIS IN THE NETHERLANDS PAPER HAS BEEN QUITE HELPFUL IN THIS CONTEXT.

THE UNITED KINGDOM PAPER LISTED SIX DESIDERATA WHICH SHOULD BE MET AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, REGARDLESS OF THE LINE OF APPROACH TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES REGARDING "FBS". THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONCURS FULLY WITH THAT ANALYSIS. THE DESIDERATA SET FORTH ARE ALL SOUND AND APPROPRIATE IN OUR OPINION. WE KEPT THEM CLEARLY IN MIND IN DEVELOPING OUR GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH, AND WE BELIEVE THEY ARE USEFUL AND WELL-FORMULATED GUIDELINES TO BEAR IN MIND DURING THE COURSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY CIRCULATED A DETAILED AND USEFUL ANALYSIS OF SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND INTERESTS IN SALT. THE GERMAN PAPER ALSO RAISED THE IDEA OF A SOVIET QUID PRO QUO FOR UNITED STATES AGREEMENT ON "FBS". IN FACT, WE HAVE CLEARLY STATED THAT OUR PROPOSAL ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION WOULD APPLY TO SOVIET NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND WAS LINKED TO AN EQUAL AGGREGATE CEILING FOR THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS AT 2350 UNITS.

IN SUMMARIZING THE COUNCIL'S VIEWS, THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF PAPER IDENTIFIED FOUR SALT-RELATED SUBJECTS OF PARTICULAR CURRENT INTEREST TO THE ALLIANCE:

-- POSSIBLE WAYS OF DEALING IN SALT TWO WITH THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS";

-- THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TRANSFERRING THE FBS PROBLEM FROM SALT TO THE MBFR FORUM;

-- THE PROBABLE SOVIET CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION IN THE
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CENTRAL SYSTEMS AGGREGATE FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH BALLISTIC
MISSILE SUBMARINES; AND

-- THE ISSUE OF NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
SYSTEMS.

AS I HAVE NOTED, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED TO
OUR PROPOSALS MADE IN MAY 1973, FOR A PROVISIONAL AGREE-
MENT AS WELL AS FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. IN THE CONTEXT
OF OUR PROPOSALS FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, INCLUDING AN
EQUAL AGGREGATE CEILING FOR CENTRAL SYSTEMS, WE SAID WE
WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER RECIPROCAL ASSURANCES TO THE
EFFECT THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD CIRCUMVENT THE AGREEMENT
THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. BY DEFINI-
TION "NON-CIRCUMVENTION" IS A GENERALIZED CONCEPT WHICH WE
BELIEVE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE
COUNCIL, INCLUDING THOSE SET FORTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL
STAFF PAPER.

AS SECRETARY ROGERS STATED AT THE JUNE 14 MINISTERIAL
MEETING IN COPEHHAGEN, AND AS NOTED IN MY LETTER TO THE
COUNCIL OF JUNE 18, IF IT BECOMES APPROPRIATE TO PRO-
POSE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION, THE UNITED
STATES PLANS TO DISCUSS ITS FORMULATION WITH THE COUNCIL
AND TO SEEK THE COUNCIL'S COMMENTS BEFORE PROPOSING IT TO
THE SOVIET DELEGATION. OUR APPROACH TO NON-CIRCUMVENTION
SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR SHARED INTERESTS. IT HAS
BEEN MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT OUR NON-
CIRCUMVENTION PROPOSAL PROVIDES A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION TO
THE QUESTION OF NON-LIMITED SYSTEMS. THE U.S. WILL NOT GO
BEYOND THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH.

THE UNITED STATES APPRECIATES THE DISCUSSION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL STAFF PAPER REGARDING THE POSSIBLE ADVAN-
TAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TRANSFERRING THE "FBS" QUES-
TION FROM SALT TO MBFR. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROS AND
CONS OF SUCH A SHIFT ARE WELL STATED IN THE PAPER. WE
PLAN TO PROCEED IN SALT CONSCIOUS OF THE DESIRABILITY OF
AVOIDING ANY PREJUDICE TO WESTERN OPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
THE HANDLING OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN MBFR.

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WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTIONS OF SOVIET COMPENSATION
IN THE AGGREGATE FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH SSBNS AND NON-
TRANSFER, THERE IS NOTHING TO ADD TO THE PREVIOUS REPORTS
TO THE COUNCIL. WE APPRECIATE THE COUNCIL'S DISCUSSION IN

THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF PAPER. IF THE SOVIETS AGAIN RAISE THE ISSUE, THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE "COMPENSATION" FOR BRITISH OR FRENCH SSBNS, AS WE DID IN NEGOTIATING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. WE HAVE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THE SUBJECT OF "NON-TRANSFER" OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT BE ADDRESSED UNTIL THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT.

IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO STATE AGAIN THE DEEP CONVICTION OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT THERE IS A VERY CLOSE IDENTITY OF INTERESTS AMONG ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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